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chapter 6
The Causes of Our Belief in Free Will: Spinoza
on Necessary, “Innate,” yet False Cognition
Yitzhak Y. Melamed
Introduction1
Spinoza deﬁnes freedom at the very opening of the Ethics. Thus, the
seventh deﬁnition of Part I of the book reads:
That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone,
and is determined to act by itself alone. But a thing is called necessary,
or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to produce
an eﬀect in a certain and determinate manner [Ea res libera dicitur, quae ex
sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur;
necessaria autem, vel potius coacta, quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum, et
operandum certa, ac determinata ratione]. (E1d7)
The pithy formulation of this deﬁnition makes clear that, for Spinoza,
freedom is opposed not to necessity,2 but to compulsion.3 After explicating
the key ontological implications of the deﬁnitions and axioms of Part I,
Spinoza returns to the issue of freedom in E1p17 – “God acts from the laws
of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one” – from which he infers the
corollary:
1 Unless otherwise marked, all quotes of Spinoza’s texts are from Curley’s translation: The Collected
Works of Spinoza. 2 vols. I would like to thank Ed Curley for generously providing me with drafts
of volume two before its publication. I have relied on Gebhardt’s critical edition (Spinoza Opera, 4
volumes) for the Latin text of Spinoza. I would like to thank Michael Della Rocca, Zach
Gartenberg, John Heil, Chip Manekin, Zoran Vukadinovic, and especially, John Morrison, for
their most helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. An early version of this chapter has
been read at the colloquium of the Philosophy Department at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. I am indebted to the participants of that session for their critical comments.
2 Thus, Spinoza’s notion of freedom – as deﬁned in E1d7 – is not only compatiblewith necessitarianism,
but in fact consists in existing and acting “from the necessity of [one’s] nature alone.” Yet, necessitar-
ianism, for Spinoza, is incompatible with the (Cartesian) notion of free will, and it is equally
incompatible with the notion of moral desert.
3 Oddly enough, in E4p49d (which cites E1d7), Spinoza contrasts freedom with necessity rather than
compulsion. I suspect this might be residual from an earlier draft of the Ethics.
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It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists only
from the necessity of his nature (by P11 and P14C1), and acts from the
necessity of his nature (by P17). Therefore (by D7) God alone is a free cause,
q.e.d. (E1p17c2. Italics added.)4
At this point, the reader clearly may anticipate Spinoza’s uncompromising
position on the issue of free will. Spinoza postpones his extensive attack on
the Cartesian notion of free will until the ﬁnal two propositions of Part II
of the Ethics (E2pp48–49), since this oﬀensive relies on an equally vehe-
ment anti-Cartesian conception of the nature of the human mind, and
thus requires the demonstration of the propositions of Part II. Still, on
several earlier occasions in the book – even in Part I that is not supposed to
discuss the nature of the human mind – Spinoza cannot stop himself from
noting the absurdity of the notion of free will. Thus, the topics of divine
freedom (E1p17s), necessitarianism (E1pp32–33), and Spinoza’s critique of
teleology (E1app) give Spinoza occasion to begin expanding his sharp
critique of freedom of the will, even before we enter Part II of the book,
which is dedicated to the study of the nature of the human mind, and
which is the proper place for the discussion of the freedom of the human
will.
This chapter will discuss Spinoza’s critique of free will, though our brief
study of this topic in the ﬁrst part of this chapter will aim primarily at
preparing us to address the main topic of this chapter, which is Spinoza’s
explanation of the reasons that force us to believe in free will.5 At times,
Spinoza seems to come very close to asserting the paradoxical claim that
we are not free to avoid belief in free will. In the second part of this chapter,
I will closely examine Spinoza’s etiological explanation of how we come to
form the belief in free will. In the third part, I will raise and respond to
a crucial objection to Spinoza’s explanation of the formation of our belief
in free will. I will then turn to examine Fichte’s intriguing claim that
Spinoza’s position on the issue of free will suﬀers from an internal contra-
diction, as evinced in Fichte’s suggestive remark: “Spinoza could not have
been convinced of his own philosophy. He could only have thought of it; he
4 Notice again that God’s being a free cause consists in nothing other than the fact that God exists and
acts “only from the necessity of his nature.” In other words, for Spinoza, freedom just is a certain kind
of necessity (i.e., necessitation from one’s nature alone). In his Freedom and Belief, Galen Strawson
notes: “Not even God could be truly self-determining as to the motives for action; nor therefore
could he be truly responsible for what he did in any ultimate way” (58). Spinoza would clearly accept
Strawson’s second claim while rejecting the ﬁrst.
5 I will not address here several important features of Spinoza’s discussion of free will, such as the
question of the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. For an interesting contex-
tualization of the latter issue, see Manekin, “Spinoza and the Deterministic Tradition.”
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could not have believed it [Er konnte seine Philosphie nur denken, nicht sie
glauben].”6
Part I: Spinoza’s Critique of Free Will
Spinoza’s reasons for rejecting the freedom of the will are pretty straight-
forward. His strict necessitarianism and determinism7 leave no place for
any feature of the world that is not fully necessitated by what follows from
God’s nature or essence (which is itself necessary8). Thus, in E1p28 Spinoza
proves that every ﬁnite thing
can neither exist nor be determined to produce an eﬀect unless it is
determined to exist and produce an eﬀect by another cause, which is also
ﬁnite and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause also can neither
exist nor be determined to produce an eﬀect unless it is determined to exist
and produce an eﬀect by another, which is also ﬁnite and has a determinate
existence, and so on, to inﬁnity.
Following the aﬃrmation of strict determinism with regards to ﬁnite
things in E1p28, Spinoza turns to proving shortly afterward that the
will – even the divine will (a topic that is proper to Part I) – cannot be free.
E1p32: The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.
6 Fichte, Fichtes Werke, I 513|; Fichte, Introductions, 98. Cf. Wood, “Fichte on Freedom,” 132.
7 By necessitarianism I understand the view that no feature of the world could be otherwise than it is.
An alternative formulation states that “whatever is possible, is necessary.” By determinism
I understand the claim that “every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together
with the laws of nature” (Hoefer, “Causal Determinism”). Obviously, one can adhere to determin-
ism while rejecting necessitarianism, if one allows for two (or more) distinct possible worlds that are
(each) thoroughly deterministic. It seems that, in principle, one may also assert necessitarianism
while rejecting determinism. Thus, one may hold that there is only one possible world, W1, and that
this possible world contains at least one event that is not necessitated by antecedent events, but is
rather self-necessitated (or is necessitated by virtue of certain features of the world, other than the
antecedent events and the laws of nature). Some philosophers consider necessitarianism as a claim
that is stronger than determinism (see Della Rocca, Spinoza, 75). I take the two claims as orthogonal.
The main texts for Spinoza’s determinism are E1a3, E1p27, and E1p28 (the latter text is discussed
brieﬂy later). The main text for Spinoza’s necessitarianism is E1p16 and its demonstration. E1p16
asserts that God’s nature or essence is necessary (perhaps implicitly relying on Ed1). In E1p16d,
Spinoza demonstrates that everything that is, follows necessarily from God’s essence. Thus, the
combination of E1p16 and its demonstration yields strict necessitarianism. Sleight, Chapelle, and
Della Rocca rightly note that determinism plays a far more substantial role than necessitarianism in
motivating Spinoza’s critique of free will (see their “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 1227).
John Morrison rightly pointed out to me that for Spinoza, necessitarianism and determinism stem
from the same line of reasoning.
8 See the crucial formulation of E1p16: “From the necessity of the divine nature” etc. Italics added. For
a very useful discussion of Spinoza’s necessitarianism, see Garrett, “Spinoza’s Necessitarianism.”
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Dem.: The will, like the intellect, is only a certain mode of thinking.
And so (by P28) each volition can neither exist nor be determined to
produce an eﬀect unless it is determined by another cause, and this
cause again by another, and so on, to inﬁnity. Even if the will be
supposed to be inﬁnite, it must still be determined to exist and produce
an eﬀect by God, not insofar as he is an absolutely inﬁnite substance,
but insofar as he has an attribute that expresses the inﬁnite and eternal
essence of thought (by P23). So in whatever way it is conceived,
whether as ﬁnite or as inﬁnite, it requires a cause by which it is
determined to exist and produce an eﬀect. And so (by D7) it cannot
be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled one, q.e.d.
Cor. 1: From this it follows, ﬁrst, that God does not produce any eﬀect
by freedom of the will (italics added).
The ﬁrst half of the demonstration addresses volitions as ﬁnite beings that
thus fall under the scope of E1p28 and as such must be fully determined by
their causes. Thus, a volition qua ﬁnite being is not “determined by its
nature alone” (E1d7), i.e., it is not free. In the second half of the demon-
stration (beginning with “Even if the will be supposed to be inﬁnite”),
Spinoza considers the possibility that a will (speciﬁcally, God’s will) might
be an inﬁnite mode (an intriguing category that Spinoza introduces and
discusses in E1pp21–239). In E1pp21–23 Spinoza proves that the inﬁnite
modes of each attribute follow necessarily from their cause: the “absolute
nature” of a given attribute.10Thus, the will, whether it is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite
mode, must follow necessarily from its causes (and not from the will’s
“nature alone”). This allows Spinoza to establish in E1p32c1 that “God
does not produce any eﬀect by freedom of the will.”
In E1p33, Spinoza presents and demonstrates his most general formula-
tion of necessitarianism.
E1p33: Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in
no other order than they have been produced.
Dem.: For all things have necessarily followed from God’s given nature
(by P16), and have been determined from the necessity of God’s
nature to exist and produce an eﬀect in a certain way (by P29).
Therefore, if things could have been of another nature, or could
9 For a detailed discussion of the inﬁnite modes and their role in Spinoza’s system, see my Spinoza’s
Metaphysics, chapter 4.
10 See speciﬁcally E1p21d (II/65/28), where the possibility that an inﬁnite mode of thought (“God’s
idea”) “does not follow necessarily from the nature [of thought] insofar as it is absolute thought” is
presented as yielding a contradiction.
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have been determined to produce an eﬀect in another way, so that the
order of Nature was diﬀerent, then God’s nature could also have been
other than it is now, and therefore (by P11) that [other nature] would
also have had to exist, and consequently, there could have been two or
more Gods, which is absurd (by P14C1). So things could have been
produced in no other way and no other order, etc., q.e.d.
The crux of Spinoza’s argument here is simple.
(1) All features of the world follow necessarily from God’s essence or
nature (premise proven earlier in E1p16).
(2) Suppose that one of the features of the world (e.g., the color of the
shortest black hair on my head) were other than how it actually is
(e.g., if it were white or gray).
(3) God’s nature would have to be diﬀerent (from (1) and (2)).
Spinoza then goes on to infer from (3) that there would have to be two or
more Gods (one with a nature that necessitates my having a black hair, the
other with a nature necessitating my having a white or gray hair). Having
more than one God (i.e., an absolutely inﬁnite substance) contradicts
E1p14 (“Except God, no substance can be or be conceived”), and thus
Spinoza concludes that (2) leads to absurdity. For our purposes Spinoza’s
inference to (3) is the most interesting. Spinoza treats the necessary causal
ﬂow from God’s essence, or nature, to all things as a logical inference, and
then infers (3) from (1) and (2) by modus tolens.
For the sake of concision I will skip over several other passages in Parts
I and II where Spinoza presents arguments against the freedom of the will
or claims that immediately imply the rejection of the will’s freedom,11 and
turn straight to his main discussion of the issue at the very end of Part II of
the Ethics.
E2p48: In the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the Mind is
determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by
another, and this again by another, and so to inﬁnity [In Mente nulla
est absoluta, sive libera voluntas; sed Mens ad hoc, vel illud volendum
determinatur a causa, quae etiam ab alia determinata est, et haec iterum
ab alia, et sic in inﬁnitum.].
Dem.: TheMind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking (by P11),
and so (by IP17C2) cannot be a free cause of its own actions, or cannot
have an absolute faculty of willing and not willing. Rather, it must be
11 See, e.g., E1p8s2 (II/51/1–7), E1p11d (II/53/7–14), E1p29, E1app (II/77/24–27), and E2p35s.
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determined to willing this or that (by IP28) by a cause which is also
determined by another, and this cause again by another, etc., q.e.d.
Spinoza’s argument in E2p48 is pretty simple.
(1) Themind is a ﬁnitemode of the attribute of thought (premise, proven
in E2p1112).
(2) “God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists from the necessity of
his nature” (premise, proven in E1p17c2).
(3) The mind is not a free cause (from (1) and (2)).
If we add the trivial premise, (2.5) “God, the absolutely inﬁnite substance is
not identical with any mode” – which Spinoza undoubtedly accepts – the
foregoing inference is valid.
Notice that in this inference Spinoza proves that the human mind is not
free in Spinoza’s sense of freedom, as deﬁned in E1d7 (i.e., existing and
acting from the necessity of one’s own nature). The notion of freedom as
uncaused is not addressed in the previous argument. The possibility of the
will as an uncaused cause has been ruled out by various earlier propositions
in the Ethics. Still, perhaps in order to address this worry, E2p48d con-
tinues by referring the reader to E1p28, which, as we have already seen,
asserts strict determinism, and thus rules out the possibility of the mind’s
acting as an uncaused cause.
Spinoza’s critique of the Cartesian notion of the will does not stop with
the rejection of free will.13 Pace Descartes, Spinoza argues that “the will” is
not a faculty at all.14 There is no will beyond the speciﬁc volition that
occurs in the mind, just as there is no stone-ness over and above the
existence of speciﬁc stones (E2p48s). Thus, our casual talk about “the
will” is just an instance of our tendency for reiﬁcation. In a further blow
targeting Descartes’ assertion that the will and intellect are distinct
faculties,15 Spinoza will prove that volitions have no existence indepen-
dently of the ideas that they aﬃrm or deny (E2p49s).16 The six-page-long
12 E2p11: “The ﬁrst thing that constitutes the actual being of a human Mind is nothing but the idea of
a singular thing which actually exists.” Since, per E2d7, a “singular thing” is a ﬁnite mode, the idea of
a singular thing must itself be a ﬁnite mode.
13 For Descartes’ aﬃrmation of free will, see among other texts Meditation Four (AT VII 57 | CSM II
40), Second Set of Replies (AT VII 166 | CSM II 116), and Passions of the Soul, I §41 (AT XI 359 |
CSM I 343).
14 For Descartes’ view of the will as the “faculty of choice,” see the Fourth Meditation (AT VII 56 |
CSM II 39).
15 See Descartes’ Fourth Meditation (AT VII 57 | CSM II 40).
16 See Della Rocca’s excellent discussion of this issue in “The Power of an Idea,” 205–212.
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scholium to E2p49 that concludes Part II of the Ethics is a concise tract on
the issue of the freedom of the will. In this text, Spinoza addresses and
refutes various arguments that attempt to establish the freedom of the will
(including some arguments Spinoza himself employed for that purpose in
his earliest works17).
Part II: Why Do We Believe in Free Will?
So far we have brieﬂy discussed Spinoza’s reasons for rejecting the
freedom of the will. Yet the most interesting and least observed feature
of Spinoza’s discussion of the freedom of the will is his detailed, elegant,
and incisive analysis of how we come to form the – false – belief in free
will. Spinoza ﬁrst presents a concise version of his analysis of the
formation of our belief in free will in the appendix to Part I of the
Ethics. The appendix is a polemical unit that aims primarily at refuting
the belief in teleology. Spinoza takes teleology to be the result of a pile of
errors,18 and therefore a full explanation of how we come to form the
belief in teleology requires a careful excavation of the layers of error that
eventually lead us to believe in ﬁnal causes. The very ﬁrst layer of error is
the belief in free will.
After listing some of the prejudices resulting from the belief in teleology,
Spinoza notes:
Of course this is not the place to deduce these things from the nature of the
human mind. It will be suﬃcient here if I take as a foundation what
everyone must acknowledge: that all men are born ignorant of the causes of
things, and that they all want to seek their own advantage, and are conscious of
this appetite.
From these [assumptions] it follows, ﬁrst, that men think themselves
free, because they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and
do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are
disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant of [those
causes]. (E1app | II/78/12–21. Italics added.)
17 Compare Spinoza’s discussion of Buridan’s Ass in E2p49s (II/135/24–31) with the discussion of the
same issue in the early Cogitata Metaphysica (II 12 | I/277/32). In the Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza
explicitly endorses Descartes’ defense of free will in the FourthMeditation and argues that insofar as
freedom is part of the essence of the human soul, it cannot be fully compelled by external things,
since nothing has the power of destroying its essence (II 12 | I/278/10).
18 The belief in divine teleology relies, among others, on the erroneous belief in human teleology.
The belief in human teleology relies on the belief in free will, though the issue requires detailed
elaboration that cannot be carried out here.
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The three elements that conspire to generate the belief in free will are:
(1) our appetites and volitions,19 (2) our consciousness of our appetites and
volitions, and, ﬁnally, (3) our general ignorance of the causes of most
things, and speciﬁcally our ignorance of the causes that shape our volitions
and appetites.20 Shortly, I will turn to showing that for Spinoza, each of
these three elements is a necessary condition and that they are jointly
suﬃcient for the formation of the belief in free will. But before we turn
to that task, let us look brieﬂy at another text where Spinoza provides
a similar analysis yet advances one step forward in explaining why we
conjure up a faculty of free will. The context of the discussion is Spinoza’s
more general claim that error and falsity consist in privation of knowledge.
To illustrate this claim Spinoza provides two examples, the ﬁrst of which is
our belief in the freedom of the will.
In P17S I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge. But to
explain the matter more fully, I shall give [NS: one or two examples]: men
are deceived in that they think themselves free [NS: i.e., they think that, of
their own free will, they can either do a thing or forbear doing it], an opinion
which consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of
the causes by which they are determined. This, then, is their idea of freedom –
that they do not know any cause of their actions. They say, of course, that
human actions depend on the will, but these are only words for which they
have no idea.21 For all are ignorant of what the will is, and how it moves the
Body; those who boast of something else, who feign seats and dwelling
places of the soul, usually provoke either ridicule or disgust. (E2p35s. Italics
added.)
19 For the distinction between will [voluntas], appetite [appetitus], and desire [cupiditas], see E3p9s:
“When this striving is related only to the Mind, it is called Will; but when it is related to the Mind
and Body together, it is called Appetite. . . .Between appetite and desire there is no diﬀerence, except
that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. So desire can be
deﬁned as appetite together with consciousness of the appetite.”
20 The role of unnoticed factors in causing our volitions and actions has been the subject of
recent studies in psychology and philosophy of psychology. Thus, in a recent survey of
literature, Joshua Shepherd writes: “Work on the role of unnoticed situational factors has
been taken to show that the commonsense understanding of action, on which we asses and
decide to act on the basis of consciously recognized reasons is misleading. In fact, many of the
features that move us to act do so via non-conscious, reason-irrelevant processes” (“Scientiﬁc
Challenges,” 200).
21 In the last sentence, Spinoza seems to claim that the common perception of the will as the causal
source of our actions is a Chimera, i.e., a mere verbal being that is not accompanied by any idea, not
even an idea of the imagination. For the distinction between Chimeras and Beings of Reason (e.g.,
universals), see CM I 1 (I/233/23–35) and CM I 3 (I/241/8–16). This claim is distinct from – though
not necessarily inconsistent with – Spinoza’s assertion in E2p48s that the will (just like all other
mental faculties) is a mere universal. Presumably, whether the will is a Chimera or a universal
depends on how one understands this term.
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According to Spinoza, the mental mechanism that generates our belief
in free will is the following. When we act (or have a desire that leads us to
act22), we are normally aware of our action or desire, but have only very
limited knowledge of the causes of our action or desire. The data we have
about why we act, or desire a certain action, is almost always incomplete, in
the sense that we do not see the known causes as necessitating the speciﬁc
course of action or desire. Sometimes, in order to understand some of
our actions or desires, we go to a psychoanalyst and spend hundreds of
hours in an attempt to explain fully one of our decisions or actions. Such
concentrated investigations aimed to achieve full transparency in our
desires and actions may or may not be successful. Yet we make thousands
of such decisions or actions every day, and in virtually all of these decisions
there is major explanatory gap between what we know about the causes
of our actions and the choice to pursue a certain action. In almost all of
these cases, our knowledge about the causes of our actions provides
a constraint about what we may choose, but hardly ever is this knowledge
so comprehensive that we perceive it as strictly necessitating a speciﬁc
action or desire.
At this point, Spinoza comes out and asks how we phenomenologi-
cally experience the explanatory gap between what we know about the
causes constraining our actions (or desires) and the actions (or desires)
that actually transpire. Since our knowledge of the causes of our
actions (or desires) hardly ever necessitates the action (or desire), we
phenomenologically experience the action (or desire) as free and not
necessitated.
Consider, for example, my moving my right hand upward. I know quite
a bit about the causes of this event insofar as I know much about my hands
and their dispositions, and I also know that my intention was to demon-
strate by this act the aforementioned explanatory gap.23 Yet I could just as
well demonstrate the same point by moving my left hand or by moving my
right hand downward. Why, then, did I move it upward? In spite of my
very intimate “familiarity” – if this is the right word – with my right hand,
it is hard for me to come up with an answer (obviously I have many
22 The current passage focuses on the action, while the passage from E1app concentrates on the volition
that leads us to the action. Of course, for Spinoza, mental items (such as volitions) cannot interact
with physical items. For the causal barrier between modes of diﬀerent attributes, see E2p6.
23 I my daily experience, I experience the intention as the cause of my action. Spinoza would,
obviously, reject any causal interaction between mental and physical items. Instead, he would
argue that it was the physical parallel of my intention that contributed to the causation of the
physical action. The example just cited attempts to capture merely the phenomenological
experience.
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conjectures, but I would need to work very, very hard in order to achieve, if
indeed I ever could, full cognitive transparency regarding the causal
trajectory that determined the speciﬁc movement of my right hand).
The explanatory gap between my limited knowledge of the reasons for
my actions (or desires) and the complete knowledge of the causal trajectory
that determines my actions creates, by necessity, the phenomenological
experience of free volitions (i.e., volitions that are not necessitated). This
experience of free volitions accompanies us in every single moment in our
lives,24 and thus the belief in free will is constantly reinforced to a degree
that it can hardly be shaken.
I mentioned earlier that the three elements that conspire to generate the
belief in free will are each necessary25 and jointly suﬃcient conditions for
the formation of this belief. Let us now look closely at each element.
(1) Were we not to have appetites and volitions, we would not form the
belief in free will even if we were self-conscious and ignorant of most causes
of our actions, since in the absence of volitions, we would have no ideas of
any volitions. (2) Were we to have volitions without consciousness of these
volitions, we would not form beliefs about these volitions since we would
not be aware of them. If having volition without consciousness does not
suﬃce to form the belief that we have volitions, clearly it should not suﬃce
to form the belief that we have free volitions. (3) Suppose we had volitions,
and were conscious of them, and yet we were equally conscious of all the
causes of our volitions. Our experience of the world would not suﬀer
from the aforementioned explanatory gap. In such a scenario, we would
experience our volitions as completely determined by their causes, just as
we would experience the movement of our body in an elevator. In both
cases, we would have a strict deterministic explanation for the changes in
the states of our minds or bodies, and this strict deterministic explanation
of our volitions would not allow the formation of the belief in free will for
two reasons. First, the belief in free will would be strictly ruled out insofar
as our experience – i.e., strict deterministic causation of the will – will
24 For Spinoza, every idea has a conative (or volitional) state built into it (see Della Rocca, “Power of an
Idea,” 211–213). Thus, whenever we have ideas, we have volitions.
25 By claiming that each element is necessary for the formation of the belief in free will I mean
only that these elements are necessary for the causal trajectory Spinoza identiﬁed as necessitat-
ing the belief in free will. Of course, one can suggest alternatives trajectories leading to the
belief in free will (and these may, or may not, include elements 1–3). To the best of my
knowledge, in his late works Spinoza does not consider such alternative trajectories (and
obviously does not prove that such trajectories are impossible). He simply claims to be
suggesting the best explanation of the phenomenon at stake (i.e., the ubiquity of the belief
in free will in spite of its obvious falsity).
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falsify the belief in free (i.e., unnecessitated) will. Second, the belief in free
will would be redundant, as it would not be needed in order to explain our
volitions.
It is thus only the contriving of all three elements – volitions, awareness
of the volitions, and ignorance of the causes of our volitions (or the
explanatory gap) – that together explain the etiology of our belief in
free will.
The passage in E2p35s stresses one further point in Spinoza’s account
of why we form the belief in free will. The constant and ubiquitous
experience of our volitions as uncaused becomes ingrained in the nature
of our minds. Yet, we may still (rightly!) ask why we have these “free”
volitions. Given the consistent absence of such explanation, claims
Spinoza, we assume the existence of an entity – the Will, or the faculty
of volition – which is taken to be the ultimate and uncaused source of
our volitions. For Spinoza, “the Will” is a black box that explains
nothing. We know nothing about its mechanisms, and the very idea
of its having causal inﬂuence over bodies is unintelligible, since volitions
qua mental items have no common measure with our body,26 and we
have no way to explain the very possibility of such causal interaction.
Thus, Spinoza concludes: “For all are ignorant of what the will is, and
how it moves the Body; those who boast of something else, who feign
seats and dwelling places of the soul, usually provoke either ridicule or
disgust” (E2p35s).27
The Ethics is a book that truly aims at elucidating the nature of human
beings and their blessedness. For that reason, Spinoza’s few remarks about
the mental life of animals are nothing more than occasional digressions
whose aim is the elucidation of the nature of the mental in general. There is
good textual evidence showing that Spinoza held that animals enjoy
a certain degree of consciousness, though this is not the place to discuss this
26 Addressing Descartes’ claim that the pineal gland is the locus of the interaction between mind and
body, Spinoza writes sardonically: “I should like very much to know how many degrees of motion
the Mind can give to that pineal gland, and how great a force is required to hold it in suspense. . . .
And of course, since there is no common measure between the will and motion, there is also no
comparison between the power, or forces, of the Mind and those of the Body. Consequently, the
forces of the Body cannot in any way be determined by those of the Mind” (E5pref | II/280/4–16.
Italics added.).
27 Cf. E3p2s: “Again, no one knows how, or by what means, the Mind moves the body, nor howmany
degrees of motion it can give the body, nor with what speed it can move it. So it follows that when
men say that this or that action of the Body arises from the Mind, which has dominion over the
Body, they do not know what they are saying, and they do nothing but confess, in ﬁne-sounding
words, that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action.”
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issue.28 Still, assuming that Spinoza ascribes consciousness to nonhuman
animals, it seems he would also assert that animals experience, just as we
do, their actions as free volitions. Clearly animals have strivings/volitions,
and clearly animals are ignorant of the causes of their volitions. If we add to
this that animals are conscious of their volitions, then the mechanism that
generates the belief in free will is already in place. I am not aware of any text
in which Spinoza discusses the free will of animals, but in a fascinating
letter dated October 1674, Spinoza provides a detailed analysis of the free
will of a moving stone. He begins his discussion by noting:
What I say here about the stone must be understood concerning any
singular thing, however composite it is conceived to be,29 and however
capable of doing many things:30 each thing is necessarily determined by
some external cause to exist and produce eﬀects in a ﬁxed and determi-
nate way.
Next, conceive now, if you will [si placet], that while the stone continues
to move, it thinks [cogitare], and knows [scire] that as far as it can, it strives to
continue moving. Of course, since the stone is conscious only of its striving,
and not at all indiﬀerent, it will believe that it is very free, and that it
perseveres in motion for no other cause than because it wills to. This is that
famous human freedom everyone brags of having, which consists only in
this: that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by
which they are determined. So the infant believes that he freely wants the
milk; the angry boy that he wants vengeance; and the timid, ﬂight. Again,
the drunk believes it is from a free decision of the mind that he says those
things which afterward, when sober, he wishes he had not said. Similarly,
28 See E2p13s (II/96/26–29): “[T]he things we have shown so far are completely general and do not
pertain more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, though in diﬀerent degrees, are
nevertheless animate. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause
in the same way as he is of the idea of the human Body. And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the
human Body must also be said of the idea of any thing” (Italics added. See also Spinoza’s similar claims
in Ep. 58). The last two sentences commit Spinoza to the view that every entity has a parallel idea or
mind (see Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 170–171). In E2pp22–23, Spinoza asserts that the mind
knows itself by having second-order ideas. E2p3 together with E2p7 commits Spinoza to the view
that the order of higher-order ideas is isomorphic with the order of ﬁrst-order ideas. Thus, it is not
only that tables and rocks have minds, but they are also endowed with some degree of cognition of
their minds (see Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 175). For a more detailed discussion of Spinoza’s
panpsychism, see my “Spinoza’s Anti-humanism,” 161–163.
29 For Spinoza, the degree of complexity of a certain body is a feature paralleling the degree of
“animation” of the mind of that body. See E2p13s | II/96/26–28.
30 Cf. E2p13s | II/97/4–10: “And so to determine what is the diﬀerence between the human Mind and
the others, and how it surpasses them, it is necessary for us, as we have said, to know the nature of its
object, i.e., of the human Body. I cannot explain this here, nor is that necessary for the things I wish
to demonstrate. Nevertheless, I say this in general, that in proportion as a Body is more capable than
others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its Mind is more capable
than others of perceiving many things at once.” Italics added.
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the madman, the chatterbox, and a great many people of this kind believe
that they act from a free decision of the mind, and that they are not set in
motion by an impulse.31
The passage presents Spinoza’s analysis of the etiology of our belief in free
will, which should be familiar to us by now. Spinoza provides several
illustrations of cases in which humans act due to impulses whose strict
deterministic causes are relatively transparent to us (though not to the
agents – such as the hungry infant – who experience their desires as free
volitions). Does Spinoza truly think that the stone “thinks [cogitare], and
knows [scire] that as far as it can, it strives to continue moving”? Scientia is
a term Spinoza normally reserves for adequate and advanced knowledge,
and thus we might read this line more as a thought experiment than as
a genuine assertion that the stone knows its striving. Still, given Spinoza’s
preface to the discussion of the stone case – “What I say here about
the stone must be understood concerning any singular thing, however
composite it is conceived to be” – I tend to consider the stone example as
illustrating a universal principle that applies to all singular things insofar as
they are singular things.32
Immediately following the passage just quoted, Spinoza makes a claim
that does not appear in the other texts we have studied so far: he argues that
our belief in free will is in some sense “innate.”
And because this prejudice is innate in all men [Et quia hoc praejuidicium
omnibus hominibus innatum est], they are not easily freed of it.33
What does Spinoza mean by the claim that the prejudice/belief in free will
is “innate in all men”? If I understand Spinoza correctly, he does not
suggest that we are born with an “innate idea” of free will,34 since such
a claim would make redundant his entire analysis of how and why we form
the belief in free will. Instead, what Spinoza seems to be asserting here is
that it is a universal human condition that we are born as beings who are
striving (i.e., having volition), conscious of our striving, and ignorant of
the causes of our striving. In other words, we are born into a condition that
necessarily excites the mechanism generating the belief in free will.
31 Ep. 58 | IV/266/7–25. The last two sentences of this passage appear verbatim in E3p2s | II/143/24–29.
32 The stone might have adequate (yet primitive) knowledge of the attributes, since the attributes
cannot be conceived inadequately, for Spinoza, insofar as the conditions for error do not obtain in
their case. In other words, if the attributes are conceived, they must be conceived adequately. This is
not, however, the proper place to investigate this intriguing issue in detail.
33 Ep. 58 | IV/266/25–26. Italics added.
34 Descartes counts the belief in free will as an innate idea and common notion. See Principles of
Philosophy, I 39.
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Notice that in the last passage Spinoza asserts that “men are not easily
freed” from the belief in free will. Prima facie, this claim seems to imply
that with some, perhaps much, eﬀort, men can be freed from the illusion of
free will. We will address this question toward the end of this chapter.
Part III: Can We Avoid the Illusion of Free Will?
In the previous section, we examined closely the three elements that
contrive to produce the false belief in free will, according to Spinoza. But
is it indeed the case that whenever these three elements obtain, the belief
in free will is necessarily produced? This question is especially urgent for
Spinoza since he is strongly committed to the key doctrine of the
conatus, according to which “each thing, as far as it can by its own
power, strives to persevere in its being [Unaquaeque res, quantum in se
est, in suo esse perseverare conatur]” (E3p6). For Spinoza, striving, willing,
and having an appetite are virtually the same: “When this striving is
related only to the Mind, it is called Will; but when it is related to the
Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite” (E3p9s). Since Spinoza is
also committed to panpsychism – i.e., the view that all bodies are
animated and have parallel ideas that are their minds35 – it is clear that
he must ascribe some degree of volition and appetite to all things, rocks
and tables included. The question then arises: why don’t I ascribe free
will to the table? Insofar as (1) the table is striving to persevere in its
being, (2) I know that the table is striving, and (3) I do not know most of
the causes of the table’s striving, it would seem that per Spinoza’s
analysis of the causes of our belief in free will, we must ascribe free will
to the table. Yet we do not.
A possible ﬁrst line of defense on the side of the Spinozist would be to
suggest that in our daily experience, we consider the states of (what we
consider to be) inanimate objects – such as rocks and tables – to be fully
determined by their causes, and thus, unlike the case of human action, we
do not experience the explanatory gap between what we know about the
causes of the table’s “action,” or movement, and the course of movement/
action that actually takes place. Since the explanatory gap is one of the
three elements that are necessary for the formation of the belief in free will,
the absence of this gap explains why we do not ascribe free will to the table
and other, so-called inanimate objects.
35 See E2p13s | II/96/26–32 and the previous section. In “Spinoza on Death,” Oded Schechter and
I provide a detailed defense of Spinoza’s panpsychism relying on his rejection of emergent qualities.
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This Spinozist response is helpful, yet not fully satisfying. Let us con-
sider a case in which we observe a table moving suddenly without knowing
the causes of its movement. We would obviously wonder at the event
taking place before our eyes, but in all likelihood, we would not ascribe free
will to the table. Instead we would consider numerous alternative explana-
tions for the surprising movement of the table (e.g., perhaps there is metal
in the table and a powerful magnet is attracting it, or alternatively, perhaps
the table is pulled by a transparent wire).36
At this point, the Spinozist may launch a second line of defense
arguing that it is only introspective consciousness [conscientia] of our
own volitions and actions that brings about our belief in free will, while
other kinds of knowledge of the striving of things will not result in the
attribution of free will to those things. In other words, my consciousness
of my own volitions is an intimate and unique kind of cognition, and it is
only this kind of cognition that excites the deep psychological mechan-
ism that generates the belief in free will. This line of defense would fail
for at least two reasons. First, Spinoza’s thoroughgoing rationalism
should not allow him to be satisﬁed merely by the declaration that
“introspective consciousness” is a special kind of cognition, and that
only this kind of cognition may excite the belief in free will. If this line of
defense is to have any value, it must ﬁrst show why the nature of the
cognition at stake (introspective consciousness as opposed to other kinds
of cognition) makes a diﬀerence with regard to the formation of the
belief in free will. Second, we normally ascribe free will to other human
beings though we have no introspective consciousness of their volitions.
Thus, the kind of cognition that excites the belief in free will cannot be
restricted to introspective consciousness. Though we have just rejected
this second line of defense, the last observation seems to point in the
direction of a satisfactory Spinozist rebuttal.
We have just asserted that in normal circumstances we would ascribe
free will to other human beings – but not to tables – though in both cases
we have no introspective consciousness of any volitions/appetites occurring
in the humans or tables at stake. Would we normally ascribe free will to
chimpanzees? Biologists and laypeople are likely to come up with diﬀerent
answers to the last question, but it seems fair to say that the more the entity
36 The Spinozist may also respond to the last argument by claiming that were we to observe the table
moving frequently enough and in a manner that could be explained as an intentional decision (e.g.,
if the table were to move whenever a saw appeared in its vicinity), we would ascribe free will to the
table. In fact, many animation ﬁlms follow precisely this very pattern.
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at stake is like us, the more likely we are to ascribe free will to it. But why is
this so?
Spinoza has a ready explanation for this phenomenon: we tend to ascribe
similar aﬀects (such as desire) to things we deem to be like us. This is
Spinoza’s doctrine of the imitation of the aﬀects (E3p27). In Part III of the
Ethics, Spinoza employs this doctrine to explain primarily sympathy and
pity, and this deep psychological mechanism also plays an important role
in the foundation of Spinoza’s political theory.37 In E3p27s, Spinoza
discusses explicitly Emulation [aemulatio], the imitation of the desires of
other beings. Here too Spinoza stresses that the imitation mechanism is
excited only with regard to a thing we deem “like us.”Nowwe can spell out
Spinoza’s intriguing answer to our original question: why do we not ascribe
free will to tables?
We do not ascribe free will to tables because we do not ascribe volitions
and appetites to tables, and we do not ascribe volitions and appetites to
tables because we deem them totally unlike us. We normally consider
ourselves as separate islands of mental life within the ocean of inanimate
nature. Spinoza rejects this view. To be sure, he would agree that we are
very diﬀerent from tables and rocks (we are far more complicated and
capable entities), yet he would argue that when we assume an abyss
between us and the rest of nature, we exaggerate this diﬀerence. This
perception of ourselves as being totally unlike the rest of nature is part of
our normal folk psychology and is deeply ingrained in our minds.
As a result, our psychological mechanisms would be less likely to ascribe
volitions and appetites to other entities to the extent that we consider these
entities unlike us.
Having responded to the objection presented at the beginning of this
section, let us turn now to another intriguing criticism of Spinoza’s analysis
of the causes of our belief in free will.
In his 1797 Second introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte praises
Spinoza as “one of the greatest thinkers of the modern age” and then turns
to refute Spinoza’s rejection of free will:
Spinoza could not have been convinced of his own philosophy. He could
only have thought of it; he could not have believed it. For this is a philosophy
that directly contradicts those convictions that Spinoza must necessarily
37 See TP Ch. 1 | III/275. For instructive discussions of the imitation of aﬀects in Spinoza, see Della
Rocca, “Spinoza’s Metaphysical Psychology,” 247–251, and Steinberg, “Imitation, Representation,
and Humanity.” I am also indebted to Michael Della Rocca for a very helpful discussion of this
issue.
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have adopted in his everyday life, by virtue of which he had to consider
himself to be free and self-suﬃcient. . . . He was convinced that a purely
objective mode of thinking [Raisonnement] must necessarily lead to his
system, and he was right about this. But in the course of his thoughts it
never occurred to him to reﬂect upon his own act of thinking; this is where
he went astray, and this is how came to place his speculations in contra-
diction with his life.38
Fichte’s presentation of Spinoza’s views on free will is mostly adequate. He
might have slightly radicalized Spinoza’s claim that men “are not easily
freed” from the belief in free will39 by ascribing to Spinoza the stronger
view that we cannot avoid the belief in free will – this is presumably the
meaning of Fichte’s claim that “Spinoza could not have believed” his own
claims about free will – yet, overall, Fichte’s presentation of the Spinozist
position is fair and penetrating. But what did Fichte mean by claiming “it
never occurred to Spinoza to reﬂect upon his own thinking”?
In a ﬁne recent study, Allen Wood has attempted to explain Fichte’s
critique of Spinoza. Wood presses two closely related points in Fichte’s
name. First, he argues:
Often we are aware of the circumstances that ground our desires, but when
we regard these circumstances as reasons for those desires, we cannot
coherently represent them as necessitating causes that make any choice
impossible. The Fichtean explanation for our conviction that our free
actions are uncaused is based on precisely this point: that we fall into
incoherence if we try to represent what we do for reasons, including the
acquisition of understanding or conviction, as causally necessitated.40
Wood’s second point attempts to highlight the alleged incoherence of the
necessitarian position from a slightly diﬀerent angle:
No matter how good the arguments on the necessitarian side may be, they
always arrive too late to admit the possibility of any rational conviction
based on them. For in order even to entertain them as rational arguments,
I must already represent myself as having a variety of possible judgments
open to me, in order to be capable of deciding the question at a time and
according to reason.41
In response to the ﬁrst point, Spinoza would most likely deny that “often
we are aware of the circumstances that ground our desires,” arguing instead
38 Fichte, Fichtes Werke, I 513 | Fichte, Introductions, 98. 39 Ep. 58 | IV/266/26.
40 Wood, “Fichte on Freedom,” 134. Notice that I have reversed the order of Wood’s presentation of
the two points.
41 Wood, “Fichte on Freedom,” 132.
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that it is very rare – if it is even possible – to have complete knowledge of all
the causes of any given volition we have; but this is a minor point. How
would Spinoza respond to Wood’s (and Fichte’s) claim that we cannot
coherently represent our reasoning and choices as necessitated?
One strategy that Spinoza could pursue would be to address the issue
ﬁrst from a third-person perspective. Let’s assume that I am observing
my close friend, Felix. Can I represent Felix’s reasoning and choices as
completely necessitated by their causes? Obviously, I normally explain
Felix’s choices (and his reasoning) through the causes acting on him.
It would seem that the more I know Felix and the causes acting on him,
the more I am likely to see his choices and volitions as determined by
these causes.42 Can I coherently represent Felix’s choices as being
necessitated by their causes? I see no reason why I could not.43 In fact,
it would seem that such a representation would be just what I would
expect to have in the extreme, limiting case of knowing all the causes
acting on Felix.
Wood’s argument, however, focuses on the ﬁrst-person perspective,
and as far I can see, the Spinozist would agree with the crux of his
argument: there is indeed a strong tension, perhaps even incoherence,
between our sturdy conviction that we freely deliberate between
alternative courses of actions – which we represent as possible44 –
and the necessitarian view, which the Spinozist contends is the una-
voidable conclusion of a consistent metaphysics. But is it indeed the
case that given such conﬂict, our libertarian convictions should have
the upper hand, since the necessitarian argument “arrives always too
late”?
In order to address the latter question, let us consider the case of
Benedictus, a patient suﬀering from a mild-to-moderate form of Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder (henceforth, OCD). The most recent edition of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders deﬁnes this condition as follows:
Obsessions are recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges, or images that are
experienced as intrusive and unwanted, whereas compulsions are repetitive
42 For Spinoza, the essence of Felix will be one of the causes determining any of the states of Felix, his
volitions included (see E2p13sA1’’). Furthermore, Spinoza would consider Felix more free the more
his actions (and volitions) can be explained through his essence, and not through external causes (see
Sleight, Chapelle, and Della Rocca, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 1231).
43 Cf. Nagel, View from Nowhere, 110.
44 For Spinoza’s deﬁnition of possibility in terms of one’s lack of knowledge of the causes that are
necessary to produce a thing, see E4d4. Cf. TIE §53.
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behaviors or mental acts that an individual feels driven to perform in
response to an obsession or according to rules that must be applied
rigidly.45
Whenever Benedictus leaves his home, he repeatedly checks that the
entrance door is properly locked. Every departure from his home
involves a ritual in which he compulsively checks the door twenty or
thirty times, and obsessively thinks about the possibility that he might
have left the door unlocked. Benedictus has gone to a therapist, and
was unmistakably diagnosed as suﬀering from OCD. To accept such
a diagnosis is really to represent one’s own patterns of thoughts as
determined by strict psycho-physiological mechanisms that compro-
mise, if not fully annul, one’s free will.46 Yet, if we approach
Benedictus a second before he checks the door lock (for the twentieth
time) and ask whether he can choose not to check the door, he would
respond positively.47 He is fully aware of his diagnosis, and yet he also
knows that if he does not check the lock again, there is some chance he
would leave the house unlocked. Indeed, if we use Wood’s formulation,
Benedictus “represents himself as having a variety of possible judgments
open to him.” There is clear conﬂict between Benedictus’ representation
of himself as having a choice between diﬀerent courses of action, and the
acceptance of the OCD diagnosis that explains his behavior as a rigid
mechanistic psychological pattern.
Should Benedictus’ representation of himself as having a choice between
diﬀerent courses of action make him reject the OCD diagnosis insofar as it
is incompatible with his representation of himself as a freely deliberating
agent? I think he should not. Benedictus is much more likely to have better
quality of life if he accepts the diagnosis and tries to treat it adequately, but
this utilitarian consideration is really the least important issue. More
signiﬁcantly, it would seem that in the current scenario rejecting the
OCD diagnosis due to its incompatibility with our deep conviction that
we are freely deliberating agents would amount to nothing short of
choosing to live under an illusion.
45 DSM-5, 235.
46 For the apparent contrast between acceptance of the diagnosis of OCD and the (simultaneous)
positing of free will, see Churchland, Brain-Wise, 208; Strawson, “Impossibility of Moral
Responsibility,” 222; and Meynen, “OCD, Free Will, and Control,” 326–328. D.A. Levy describes
OCD as a “malady of free will” (“Neural Holism and Free Will,” 214).
47 Describing a similar case, Meynen writes: “She is, in her own words, almost completely in control
with respect to the cleaning of the house” (“OCD, Free Will, and Control,” 328). Dr. Zoran
Vukadinovic pointed out to me that addiction also involves the illusion of free choice.
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Along the same lines, Spinoza would argue, rejecting necessitarianism
just because it conﬂicts with our deeply ingrained self-perception as freely
deliberating agents would be to engage in a similar act of self-deception
(assuming necessitarianism is, otherwise, well-motivated).48
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied Spinoza’s explanation for our conviction
that we are freely acting agents. We have seen that, according to Spinoza,
the belief in free will is innate and very hard to eradicate. Spinoza thinks
that by recognizing the necessity of things, we can lessen the grip of the
passions on our minds.49 Thus, recognizing the necessity of things has
a certain therapeutic value. This said, I tend to think Fichte was right
in ascribing to Spinoza the view that we can never liberate ourselves
from the belief in free will. The psychological mechanism that elicits
our belief in free will accompanies us at every moment of our lives,
and such a ubiquitous psychological mechanism seems impossible to
dismantle. In this regard, our feeling of freedom is not unlike other
illusions of the imaginations. Just as we do not stop imagining the sun
to be very close to us when we learn its true distance, so, it seems, we do
not stop perceiving ourselves as acting out of free will even when we learn
that the will is never free.50
Spinoza’s view of the belief in free will as innate yet false cognition raises
several intriguing epistemological issues.51 Recall that, for Descartes, innate
cognitions, which we cannot resist asserting must be true, since otherwise
48 Notice that my Benedictus case is just an updated variation on Spinoza’s discussion in Ep. 58 of “the
infant that believes that he freely wants the milk, the angry boy that wants vengeance, and . . . the
drunk who believes it is from a free decision of the mind that he says those things which afterward,
when sober, he wishes he had not said.”
49 See E5p6: “Insofar as the Mind understands all things as necessary, it has a greater power over the
aﬀects, or is less acted on by them.”
50 See E2p35s. Cf. Barry, “Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom.” Yet the analogy with the case of our
perception of the sun is somewhat incomplete since in the case of our perception of the sun we are
readily convinced about its true distance once we learn it, while in the case of our belief in free will it
is extremely hard for us to counter this persistent illusion due to its deep grounding in the conditions
of human action. One place where Spinoza seems to assert that it is hardly possible for us to
internalize and act according to the truth of necessitarianism is Letter 43: “Whether we do what we
do necessarily or freely, we are still led by hope and fear” (IV/223/18–19).
51 Another epistemological issue, unrelated to innateness, is whether Spinoza’s view on free will is an
instance of Moore’s Paradox (i.e., whether we should ascribe to Spinoza the assertion:
“Necessitarianism is true, but I do not believe it”). This question cannot be adequately addressed
here.
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God, who created us in such a condition, would be a deceiver.52 For
Spinoza, such an argument has little force; God may well be a deceiver,53
since Spinoza’s God has no concepts of good and evil.54
Some current philosophers consider freedom of the will an undeniable
fact.55 The so-called intuitive appeal of the belief in free will is pretty
strong.56 Remarkably, Spinoza has a powerful explanation of why we have
such a strong conviction. By providing an elegant explanation for this most
common “intuition” Spinoza pulls the rug out from under the legs of the
proponents of free will. Thus, the real import of Spinoza’s discussion of free
will lies not in showing that freedom (qua uncaused action) and determin-
ism are incompatible – a fairly trivial claim – but in providing a simple and
reﬁned explanation for one of our most deep-seated, and yet, false, beliefs.
52 See Descartes’ Meditations, AT VII 79–80 | CSM 2 55–56. 53 See TTP, chapter 2 | III/31.
54 See E4p68d: “I call him free who is led by reason alone.” Since God is free and “is led by reason
alone,” he cannot have concepts of evil (by E4p64) and good.
55 See, e.g., Van Inwagen’s categorical assertion: “free will undeniably exists” (“Free Will Remains
a Mystery,” 158). Addressing necessitarianism, Van Inwagen describes this position as simply
“absurd” (Essay on Free Will, 202).
56 See Nahmias, “Close Calls,” 627–628.
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